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A COMMENT ON “LEGISPRUDENCE” 
VLAD PERJU∗ 
In his essay, Legitimacy and Legitimation in the Legisprudential 
Perspective, Luc Wintgens sets out what it takes to fulfill the promise of 
modernity.1  According to Wintgens, essential parts of that promise are 
compromised when self-governing citizens cannot challenge the authority of 
laws having an “overwhelming impact” on their freedom; when the political 
system shackles the will of its subjects instead of providing them with the 
structure in which to flourish; and when political and social imagination have 
become atrophied due to a lack of choice among alternative ways to organize 
society.  Wintgens answers this rather dismal predicament with a call to 
radicalize democracy and set the demos free.  Rational legislation is central to 
his call and its foundations and principles form the object of legisprudence.  
This is an ambitious project.  My aim here is to comment briefly on its 
assumptions and claims as I understand them. 
The leitmotif of legisprudence is the reversal of the legitimation chain in 
modern democracies between citizens and legislators.  In Wintgens’s view, 
self-government requires a restatement of the legislative prerogative – a 
prerogative that has been described as the power “to create rules without the 
need for justifying them.”2  Like Habermas, who argues that the only 
legitimate laws are those whose addressees can see themselves as the laws’ 
rational authors,3 Wintgens makes justification a condition of legitimacy.  
Citizens are owed reasons for the laws they must obey.  In modern 
democracies, legal rules that limit the freedom of individuals should be the 
object of actual – not hypothetical – processes of active legitimation qua 
justification.  These processes of justification are comprehensive since, for 
Wintgens, it appears that all legal rules limit freedom: “Freedom as a starting 
point – that is, freedom unlimited – logically includes the absence of any 
 
∗ Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. S.J.D., Harvard Law School. I am 
grateful to the participants in the conference on “The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of 
Congress in the 21st Century” for comments on a previous draft.   
1 Luc Wintgens, Legitimacy and Legitimation from the Legisprudential Perspective, in 
LEGISLATION IN CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN LEGISPRUDENCE 3, 4 (Luc J. Wintgens & Philippe 
Thion eds., 2007). 
2 Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19, 29 (1969). 
3 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 454 (William Rehg trans., 1998) (“The addressees of law 
would not be able to understand themselves as its authors if the legislator were to discover 
human rights as pregiven moral facts that merely need to be enacted as positive law.”). 
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limitation.”4  This claim is insufficiently supported in his essay.  If one 
believes that political concepts do not have normative DNA, as Ronald 
Dworkin put it5 and as Wintgens seems to agree,6 then it is necessary to 
identify and defend a standpoint (in history, language, political discourse, etc.) 
that supports an understanding of freedom as the absence of any limitation.7  
While Wintgens gestures towards such a standpoint at various points in his 
essay, more needs to be said to allay misgivings that the project of 
legisprudence rests on “conceptions about freedom” that masquerade as 
“conceptions of freedom.”8 
This line of criticism mirrors the charge that Wintgens himself levels against 
his main interlocutors, Hobbes and Rousseau.  Wintgens argues that these 
social contract theorists fail the promise of modernity by reviving pre-modern 
attempts to portray law as a representation of the natural order, rather than as 
an artifact of human will.9  In Wintgens’s view, one effect of this social 
contract theory is to reinforce the “thereness” of a legal system which remains 
outside of the reach of self-governing citizens whose freedom it constrains.10  
Another effect of this theory is a blurring of the distinction between 
construction and representation – a distinction which Wintgens sees as central 
to the project of modernity.11 The implication for legal legitimacy is that 
procedural theories of legitimation remain procedural in name only.  Once 
 
4 Wintgens, supra note 1, at 23.  One implication is that the requirement of justification 
applies to each and every law, rather than a set of “constitutionals essentials.”  For the idea 
of “constitutional essentials,” see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 227-30 (1996).  For 
the argument that in liberal political morality the requirements of justification apply to the 
system as a whole, rather than to particular instances of lawmaking, see Frank Michelman, 
Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 64, 82-83 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). 
5 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 153 (2006). 
6 Wintgens, supra note 1, at 10 (“Concepts are not natural; they are intellectual 
constructions.”). 
7 For a discussion of what such an argument might look like, see Discussion, in THE 
LEGACY OF ISAIAH BERLIN 121-39 (Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin & Robert Silvers eds., 
2001). 
8 Wintgens, supra note 1, at 3.  Another relevant question is what happens with 
Wintgens’s distinction between conceptions about freedom and conceptions of freedom in 
homogeneous cultural groups whose members share a conception of freedom.  I do not 
explore this issue here, as the “fact of pluralism” can be assumed as a given in pluralist 
societies.  See RAWLS, supra note 4, at xviii (“Political liberalism assumes that, for political 
purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal 
result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime.”). 
9 See Wintgens, supra note 1, at 10 (“The democratic organisation of political space in 
the Modern philosophical project purports to be more radical than its classical version.  
Democracy, that is, is not a natural fact nor does not follow from the nature of the polis.”). 
10 Id. at 22. 
11 Id. at 29. 
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external normative presuppositions are built into the method of active 
legitimation, they make the standard of legitimacy relate to a “truth” that 
transcends that very process of legitimation.  This unintended, yet unavoidable, 
consequence makes process-based theories of legitimation similar to 
substantive models which the procedural turn was supposed to replace.  What 
are these “external” normative presuppositions?  Wintgens sees them as 
anything other than pure will.12  For Hobbes, they are the command of God, 
confirmed by human reason; for Rousseau, they are the “cognitive standards” 
which history brings to light.13  Thus, in Wintgens’s interpretation, the fact that 
truth corrupts pure will turns Hobbes’s and Rousseau’s conceptions of 
democracy into mere “proxies.”14 
While an exegesis of classical social contract theory goes beyond the aim of 
this Essay, Wintgens’s broader claim about the possibility of rational 
legislation that operationalizes the political space in radical democracies raises 
a number of questions.  His defense of procedural versus substantive theories 
of legitimation rests on assumptions about the centrality of pure will as the 
only principium of democracy.  He writes that “a procedural model of 
legitimation cannot refer to anything but itself or some other procedural model.  
Self-reference is the type of reference we find in a democratically organized 
political space.”15  Part of the appeal of this procedural conception stems from 
its openness to constant revision, and the related promise of justifying coercion 
solely by reference to the citizens’ own conceptions about freedom.  Openness 
deflates strong legalism – which Wintgens labels as “nominalism in a realistic 
dress”16 – and replaces the uni-directional legitimation chain with dialectical 
exchanges among citizens as sovereigns. 
The choice of procedure over substance motivates the post-metaphysical 
turn in political philosophy,17 and is one of the axes around which 
contemporary constitutional theory has revolved.18  At issue is the desirability 
and the possibility of purely procedural theories of legitimacy.  Apart from the 
inherent difficulty of distinguishing between will and reasoning about will, the 
utility of a conception of democracy that confines itself to theorizing about the 
 
12 Id. at 12. 
13 Id. at 10, 12. 
14 Id. at 12-13 (“What then both Hobbes and Rousseau are justifying, is not first of all a 
radical version of democracy, but a proxy version of it. . . .  The very proxy character of 
their version of democracy stems from its foundation in truth.”). 
15 Id. at 8. 
16 Id. at 7. 
17 See Jürgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on 
John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109, 118-20 (1995); see also RAWLS, supra 
note 4, at 372-434 (replying to Habermas’s critique); Frank I. Michelman, Family Quarrel, 
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163, 1163-64 (1996). 
18 For an early classic, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063 (1980). 
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first principles of freedom is questionable.  Its central difficulty is how far 
reflection on pure will qua will can take us.  Reliance on pure will may just be, 
as social theory has discovered since the nineteenth century, a form of 
surrender to the normatively blind social processes that shape that will.19  In 
any event, the point of such a theory, even accepting arguendo Wintgens’s 
premise, is to inform us as to how freedom can operationalize the political 
sphere.  Within that sphere, “structured freedom” is different from “freedom” 
tout court, and Wintgens himself argues that political freedom can – indeed, 
must – be limited.20  Does this theory not require, however, the application of 
reason to will, a reason that co-opts will in its project?  It is unclear why the 
presence of reason de-radicalizes the project of modernity (is modern natural 
law an oxymoron?) and should be removed from the foundations of the 
province of legisprudence.21  In this context, it would have been interesting to 
read the terms of Wintgens’s engagement with Rawls’s hypothetical social 
contract, a constructivist enterprise that – at least at first blush – retains the 
reflective dimension characteristic of procedural theories of legitimation.22 
Moving now to Wintgens’s prescriptions, they seem surprisingly moderate 
given the dark tones in which he portrays the predicament of modern 
democracies.  While reversals in the chain of legitimation undermine strong 
legalism, Wintgens does not make the case for a post-legalist paradigm.  
Rather, he defends a version of weak legalism.23  He shares with Roberto 
Unger the vision of radicalizing democracy, but not Unger’s unwavering 
interest in, and radical prescriptions for, the institutional structure of 
democracy.24  Furthermore, and pace Jeremy Waldron,25 Wintgens does not 
argue that judicial review undermines the dignity of rational legislation.  To the 
 
19 See generally GEOFFREY HAWTHORN, ENLIGHTENMENT AND DESPAIR: A HISTORY OF 
SOCIAL THEORY (1987). 
20 Wintgens, supra note 1, at 9. 
21 See id. at 12. 
22 See id. at 8 (“Just as freedom only makes sense when exercised in freedom, a 
procedural model of legitimation cannot refer to anything but itself or some other procedural 
model.  Self-reference is the type of reference we find in a democratically organized 
political space.”). 
23 See generally LUC J. WINTGENS, DROIT, PRINCIPES ET THEORIES: POUR UN POSITIVISME 
CRITIQUE (2000) (arguing for weak legalism as part of a critical positivist approach to legal 
theory). 
24 See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN 
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987). 
25 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 20 (1993) (“[O]ur respect for such democratic rights is called 
seriously into question when proposals are made to shift decisions about the conception and 
revision of basic rights from the legislature to the courtroom . . . .”); Jeremy Waldron, The 
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006) (“[J]udicial 
review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode of final decisionmaking in a free and 
democratic society.”). 
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contrary, he lists judicial review, alongside referenda or elections, as a practice 
that reverses the legitimation chain in modern democracies.26  With the partial 
exception of judicial review in the French, and French-influenced legal 
systems,27 the list refers to features that are quite familiar to modern 
democracies.  Has the shift from strong to weak legalism not already taken 
place? 
To answer that question, one needs to look closer at how these mechanisms 
perform in practice before gauging if they can fulfill the promise of modernity.  
I focus here solely on judicial review, specifically on how courts apply the 
method of proportionality to demand reasons when reviewing the validity of 
legislation.  Since proportionality is arguably one tool for forcing the 
legislature in the direction of greater rationality, the question is what, if 
anything, can legisprudence contribute to this endeavor? 
Proportionality, which has been hailed as the “most successful legal 
transplant[] in the second half of the twentieth century,”28 is a method that 
courts use in structuring the inquiry into the validity of legislation under that 
legal system’s constitution.29  The method has four steps.  At step one, often 
described as the preliminary step, courts inquire into the purpose of the law 
under review.30  Following this preliminary inquiry are the three steps of the 
traditional proportionality analysis.  First, courts ask if the law is a suitable 
means for achieving the stated purpose.  Second, they examine whether or not 
the law is necessary to achieve those purposes, specifically in terms of whether 
means are available which would be less intrusive upon constitutional rights.  
The last step is balancing, or proportionality stricto sensu.  Here, courts 
specifically assess the proportionality of the measure by balancing the loss that 
 
26 Wintgens, supra note 1, at 38 (arguing that constitutional review can function as the 
“third mechanism of reversal of the legitimation chain,” so long as constitutional judges are 
elected and their appointments are “confirmed by an act of parliament”). 
27 The French exception must now be qualified in light of the latest developments in the 
French constitutional order.  See EDOUARD BALLADUR ET AL., COMITÉ DE RÉFLEXION ET DE 
PROPOSITION SUR LA MODERNISATION ET LE RÉÉQUILIBRAGE DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA VÈME 
RÉPUBLIQUE (2007), available at http://www.comite-constitutionnel.fr/le_rapport/index.php 
(proposing reforms to the French Constitution). 
28 Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of 
Constitutional Justice, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 574, 595 (2004). 
29 Perhaps the most comprehensive limitations clause is section 36 of the 1996 South 
African Constitution: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose. 
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36. 
30 See Kumm, supra note 28, at 579. 
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results from the intrusion on a constitutional right with the gain that is achieved 
by the satisfaction of the goal pursued by the law under review.  Legislation 
that fails any of these steps is invalidated.31 
Not surprisingly, institutional considerations influence judicial 
assertiveness.  While judges in different legal systems differ in how they apply 
the proportionality test, they tend to defer to the legislator in the preliminary 
inquiry regarding the purpose of the law, and in the first step involving the 
suitability of the legislation under review as the chosen means for 
accomplishing that purpose.32  Judicial deference can be explained on 
structural grounds of separation of powers – the democratically elected branch 
has the right to set its policy agenda and to choose the means by which to 
pursue it.33  This approach has been criticized as overly deferential to the 
legislature.34  However, it is impossible to replace structural deference with 
substantive engagement without a theory that provides the terms of 
engagement between the courts and the legislature at the early steps of 
proportionality analysis.  Legisprudence can be that theory.  Its promise is to 
 
31 For an example of the application of the proportionality test, see id. at 579-81. 
32 See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 388-89 (2007) (explaining that to satisfy step one 
of the proportionality test, “the German Constitutional Court requires a ‘legitimate purpose.’  
By legitimate the Court understands a purpose not prohibited by the Constitution. . . .  As a 
result, hardly any law fails at this preliminary step. . . .  The vast majority of laws that failed 
to pass the proportionality test in Germany do so at the third step.”). 
33 Id. at 388 (inferring that the German Constitutional Court defers to the legislature in 
the early steps of the proportionality test because “[w]hat is important enough to become an 
object of legislation is a political question and has to be determined via the democratic 
process”).  While some courts have experimented with a more assertive approach along the 
lines of heightened scrutiny, these courts eventually returned to their normal standard of 
deference, thus pushing the focus of the proportionality analysis to the final steps.  See id. at 
388-95 (discussing the difference between the proportionality analysis of the German and 
Canadian supreme courts – particularly the heightened step one standard of the Canadian 
Court, which “requires an objective ‘of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right of freedom,’ or a ‘pressing and substantial’ concern” 
(quoting R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 352 (Can.))). 
34 Justice Barak, former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, has expressed doubts 
about the wisdom of deferring to the legislature: 
Despite the centrality of the object component, no statute in Israel has been annulled 
merely because of the lack of a proper object [or purpose].  A similar approach exists 
in German constitutional law. . . .  That is regrettable.  The object component should be 
given an independent and central role in examining constitutionality, without linking it 
solely with the means for realizing it.  Indeed, not every object is proper from the 
constitutional perspective.  This is not an expression of a lack of confidence in the 
legislature; rather, it is the expression of the status of human rights. 
Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 371 
(2008) (footnotes omitted). 
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help articulate principles of legislation that will recast how courts and 
legislators interact. 
Alas, the task of formulating such terms of substantive engagement is a 
daunting one.  This is particularly true given the already overcharged 
relationship between courts and legislators.  In his earlier work, Wintgens 
articulates four principles of legislation: alternativity, normative density, 
temporality, and coherence.35  I want to highlight some of the difficulties that 
await the legisprude at this stage by dwelling briefly on the principle of 
alternativity. 
According to the principle of alternativity, “external limitation[s] of freedom 
[must] be justified as an alternative for failing social interaction.”36  This 
principle rests on assumptions about the self-regulation of social practices that 
are not particularly obvious.  Wintgens’s earlier claim that “an external 
limitation of the sovereign [must be justified as] preferable to the absence of an 
external limitation”37 is in line with his more recent claim that “[t]he 
overwhelming volume of external limitations of freedom” are the work of an 
“overactive sovereign.”38 However, lest one should commit the “scholastic 
fallacy,”39 there is a need to justify the conception of human freedom packed 
into these principles of legislation.  This takes us full circle to my earlier point 
about further justification of the relation between freedom and rational 
legislation. 
It is fitting to end with one last cautionary remark, this time about legal 
justification itself. Wintgens’s case about the importance of legislative 
justification to self-governing citizens in modern democracies is convincing.   
Legal reasoning, however, is not danger-free.  Specifically, the rhetoric of legal 
justification might push arguments in a necessitarian direction.  In law, 
descriptive arguments about the current state of the social world carry greater 
legal weight than prescriptive arguments about what society should look like.  
When courts – interested in convincing their own audiences – claim to 
represent reality in their decisions, this more or less guarantees that legislative 
reason-giving for the purpose of judicial review will appear in a similar format.  
Having escaped the trap of representation-reproduction outside legal discourse, 
self-governing citizens might fall into a similar trap that awaits – and is equally 
well hidden – within legal discourse itself. 
There is much more to say about Wintgens’s essay and the larger 
intellectual project.  In this brief Essay, I have raised a number of questions 
regarding his theory’s assumptions about the nature of freedom, its reliance on 
 
35 Luc J. Wintgens, Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation, 19 RATIO JURIS 1, 
10-24 (2006). 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. at 11. 
38 Wintgens, supra note 1, at 36. 
39 Id. at 14 (“The scholastic fallacy consists of leaving aside the presuppositions that are 
inherent to a theory.”). 
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“pure will” to delineate strictly between procedural and substantive theories of 
legitimacy, and its role in a possible shift from structural deference to 
substantive engagement in the relation between the courts and legislators in the 
first steps of the proportionality analysis.  Wintgens’s inviting approach to 
judicial review opens interesting avenues for legisprudence.  If jurisprudence 
traditionally showed little interest in legislation, it would be unfortunate for 
scholars to turn a blind eye on the work of courts now that legislation begins to 
receive the attention it deserves.  As such, articulating principles of legislation 
for use within the proportionality framework is an area where legisprudence 
can make an important contribution. 
